School of Americas and Human Rights: Defense and Critique

The former U.S. Army School of the Americas, now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC) has been a controversial arm of U.S. foreign policy. It was founded in Panama in 1946 to provide American training to Latin America soldiers from nations that are friendly to the U.S. Today, the principal location is at Fort Benning, Georgia. Soldiers from several Latin American countries travel there to receive both combat and classroom training, including courses on human rights. However, there has been strong criticism over time that the institution has contributed to, and perhaps worsened, what is perceived to be by many a poor military human rights record in Latin America.

The article “Human Rights Instruction at the U.S. Army School of the Americas” is a defense of the WHISC and its human rights program, as well as an attempt to demonstrate that the media has given the Latin American armed forces a worse human rights reputation than it has deserved. The article is primarily written by Dr. Russell W. Ramsay, with contributions from Major Antonio Raimondo. Dr. Ramsay is a distinguished resident professor from the WHISC who lectures in Spanish on strategy at the Inter-American Defense College at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Though Dr. Ramsay makes some valid points about the possibility of bias against the WHISC and its direct causal relation to some atrocities, his overall defense of the institution’s human rights program and the Latin American armed forces is flawed.

One of the key themes of Dr. Ramsay’s essay is that the Latin American armed forces are not as bad as the mainstream media presents them. One reason given is domestic approval within Latin America. According to him, polls taken at 10 year intervals since 1830 would surprise academic analysts of the region about the amount of positive response the defense and law enforcement would get from the public (Raimondo 96). He claims, of course, that reformist and leftist elements would report hatred of the armed forces, but the majority of the citizenry would not (Raimondo 97). This is a terrible analysis for two reasons. One, obviously, is that he himself admits that it is speculation: “The results of an honest public opinion poll…would surprise most U.S. academics” (Raimondo 97). “Would” surprise academics - - only if someone had taken them. It is a wonder why he would even include this in an article that appears to be an academic response to a serious topic. The other reason is that human rights violations are not taken into consideration in the poll. Even if such polls were taken, it would not justify the abuses of the minorities and political opposition that he himself admits may have been omitted. His analysis can be construed as an excuse for violations because the majority was content with what were, in most of the Latin American cases, counterinsurgency wars. By mentioning that the leftists and reformists “would” hate the armed forces exposes his own bias against these groups. There is no elaboration on whether these people deserve the same rights as other groups.

An important technique used to defend the Latin American armed forces is comparative analysis. In the poll example above, if taken, would have been compared to polls from the other regions: “But if such polls had been taken and compared with similar polls taken in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, eastern and even central Europe, the Latin American armed forces would rank surprisingly high as defenders of human rights in public estimation” (Raimondo 97). To make an effective comparative analysis, a comparison should be done with regions known to have a good record. Even if the polls were taken, and the author proven to be correct, that would only mean Latin America is “not as bad” as some regions. This argument would be more effective using a comparison with countries like Canada or Great Britain - - countries who’s records are considerably better than countries in Africa or the Middle East.

In another comparison with other regions is, the amount of wars in Latin America since 1830 and the limited military budgets are used. There have only been two major international wars in each of the 19th and 20th centuries. The region has also been the only to limit its military expenditures to roughly two percent during this period (Raimondo 101). However, what these facts do not take into account is that most Latin nations have had a traditionally weak state, accounting for the lack of total international war as well as high expenditures. The result is, as became particularly evident in the second half of the 20th century, that the weak state, coupled with chronic disparity of wealth, has led to internal, limited conflict as opposed to international “total” war (Centeno 17). Internal conflict has led to numerous civilian abuses by state power, since counterinsurgency wars are basically wars against certain populations within a state, and not external powers. Opposing lines are hard to draw, and liberties are taken by the state to “err on the side of caution,” such as what happened in El Salvador and Argentina.

To further the argument that Latin America has seen less violence, the author states that the region has the: “Lowest deaths, percentage of deaths of any major world region. No toxic gas stocks or nuclear weapons.” Given these facts, the author questions, “why so much academic ink is employed on the generic vilification of the Latin American armed forces, when the same forces in other world regions are worse on all accounts?” (Raimondo 101). These facts do not reflect the effects of internal war. The effects of terror and human rights violations on the population in these types of conflicts are wide spread. The numbers do not have to be high to be effective, and the methods used do not have to be chemical or nuclear. Torture, mutilation, summary executions, and disappearances, have been common techniques for Latin American forces, regardless of their comparison to other regions. These methods are not expensive and perhaps do not have the same body counts as, international wars, but they do inflict significant physical and psychological damage on the population.

Oliver Cromwell’s “Black Legend” is referenced to present five explanations why the poor human rights record in Latin America is exaggerated. First, there is an implication that scholars are racist in their implication of the Latin American soldier’s love of violence and contempt for the citizen. According to Dr. Ramsay, this region has the “lowest record of military human rights violations” (Raimondo 103). However, there is no data or reference to back this statement. Second, there is an accusation that there is a liberal bias in U.S. Latin American scholars. This may be true, but there is no measure for this bias. There is no data to defend the record of the Latin American armed forces. Hence, the bias cannot be put in perspective. The third point the author makes is that Latin American armies have been submitted to close scrutiny in their budgets, arms and troop strengths to a much better degree than other developing regions. This point has little to due with human rights since armed forces for the most part do not go out of the way to keep immaculate records of their own abuses. Budgets and inventories are irrelevant in this respect. Another problem with this is that the author is again making the comparison to developing regions who may not have good records either. The author is implying that somehow armed forces are not subject to the same human rights scrutiny in poor nations as they are in the wealthier ones. Fourth, a myth has been created by the Cuban government and Andean drug traffickers during the Cold War to discredit the opposing armed forces. There definitely has been a propaganda campaign, and Cuba has continued with this post-Cold War. However, there are no specific examples of “faked massacres,” and trumped up witnesses. The statement “it is now virtually impossible to sort out truth from fantasy, especially in the academic literature” amounts to only hyperbole. The final reason the author feels the “Black Legend” has been a disservice to the armed forces is that the U.S. news media has been selective and sensationalistic in its coverage of Latin America armed forces abuses (Raimondo 103). There may be some merit to this, however it does not address the problem of the high number of existing, documented violations, only to defend them as “exaggerated.” There is no example given here to elaborate on the theory, however there is an example in another section that is relevant. In the well publicized incident in El Salvador where six Jesuit priests were murdered during the conflict of the early 80s, it is largely unknown that School of the Americas graduates from the Salvadorian army were the ones who risked their lives and blew the whistle on the ones who were guilty of the massacre (Raimondo 106). So in a sense, there is some bias in the reporting. However, this is only a footnote in what is a long list of massacres, violations, and abuses documented by several Latin American armies with graduates from the WHISC.

The author, with all these concepts, is trying to defend the Latin American armed forces because the WHISC has trained many soldiers that have gone on to commit human rights violations, as well as soldiers that became dictators, such as Efraín Rios Montt. One of the defenses of the WHISC regarding the relationship between its human rights training and the perception that its students are not adhering is the distinction between cognitive and affective education (Raimondo 106-107). With cognitive education, such as how to clean a gun, the results of the teaching can be measured objectively. Affective education, such as how much human rights ideology sinks in, cannot. Thus, the author implies that the WHISC is doing what it can to teach human rights, but the fact that graduates are not adhering to the teaching does not make the school responsible. I would agree that there is limited truth to this. However, this opens up a complex issue of culpability. A much deeper analysis is needed to explore the effectiveness of the program. If there have and continue to be a number of problems with graduates, is it logical to still operate the program? At some point the school has to take responsibility.

To conclude the article there is an elaborate description of the schools Human Rights Curriculum in the1990s. Details are given about three components: Ethical Foundations; Legal Considerations; and Operational Imperatives (Raimondo 109). The soldiers must also adhere to a Code of Ethics that is punishable when violated (Raimondo 110). To further the ethical foundation there is a class on Just War Doctrine (Jus ad Bellum), as well as legal considerations (Jus in Bello) (Raimondo 110). Women and gay rights, as well as the Pinochet case study (Raimondo 111) are all part of the curriculum. The program, in theory, seems fairly extensive and inclusive. What becomes problematic is that there is evidence that has surfaced about torture manuals being assembled and used for courses both at the WHISC and for field training within Latin America (“Prisoner Abuse”). It is perplexing why this was not mentioned since the article was written after the evidence surfaced. Perhaps there has been reforms by the date of the article, but the omission of the controversy from this article that attempts to provide a defense of the school’s human rights record can only be perceived as deliberate. Thus, the credibility of the argument must further be questioned.

In conclusion, this article does a poor job of defending the WHISC. Comparative analysis is flawed by setting low expectations, and most of the opinions are not backed with data or clear examples. In addition, there is a tone of anti-Communist bias (“neo-Marxist” is used a number of times to describe intellectuals or opposition), along with ethnocentric sentiments, such as the idea that the school provides “courses in Spanish that would otherwise only reach out to English-speaking personal” (Raimondo 92).



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